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Trends in Economic Independence of Young Adults in the United States: 1973-2007 
 
1. Introduction 
The transition to adulthood since the late 1970s has become increasingly complicated and 
prolonged compared to the very swift passage that occurred in the post-World War II era.1 
Typically, the demographic package of adult transitions has included such markers as leaving 
home, finishing education, securing a job, and marrying or cohabiting, and having children 
(Settersten, Furstenberg and Rumbaut 2006). In the post-war years, the transition occurred 
quickly (usually by age 25 for both men and women) and in an orderly sequence beginning with 
school completion, full-time work, and home-leaving. Since then, the transition has lengthened 
and become more circuitous.  
 Public and scientific discussion over why the transition to adulthood changed so suddenly 
has not yet reached any consensus on this question. Clarifying this question involves, we 
contend, understanding when and how economic self-sufficiency is attained.  There has been 
considerable speculation that shifts in the labor market require more education and training to 
become economically secure enough to establish a family (Berlin, Furstenberg and Waters 
2010). Moreover, the structure of the U.S. labor market itself has been reformed significantly in 
the last 30-40 year in the face of global competitive pressure. Increase in earnings inequality, in 
employment instability, and shortening of job tenure due to higher turnover are some of the most 
relevant changes that occurred since 1970s. Together with these structural changes, youths’ 
expectations about what it takes to live independently have risen, along with the actual costs of 
living. 
This paper explores the trends in the achievement of economic self-sufficiency over time 
by comparing the life course of young adults in 1973, 1987 and in 2007, using data from the 
National Longitudinal Surveys in 1966 (NLS Original Cohorts), in 1979 (NLSY79) and 1997 
(NLSY97). These three data sets enable us to compare individuals between ages 22 and 30 in 
                                                          
1Even though the delay in the transition is less pronounced in the United States than in some countries in Europe – 
such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, where today young adults leave home in their late 20s, between 5 and 7 years later 
than those leaving home in the 1960s and 1970s (Billari, Francesco C., and Chris Wilson. 2001. Iacovou, Maria. 
2001.) – over the last three decades, Americans have experienced large changes in rates of household formation and 
dissolution. Age at leaving parental home, age at marriage and rates of non-marriage, extra-marital childbearing and 
divorce have all risen (Aassve, Arnstein, Simon Burgess, Andrew Chesher, and Carol Propper. 2002. Billari, 
Francesco C., and Chris Wilson. 2001.). 
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1973, 1987 and 2007, while accounting for the role of educational attainment and family 
background. Our research builds on a line of previous research suggesting that it takes longer 
today to build the human capital necessary to establish economic independence and as a 
consequence, a growing number of young adults may linger for a long time in a state of semi-
autonomy.  
The next section presents a review of the past works on labor market outcomes and 
economic self-sufficiency, trying to reflect about the causes of its postponement. After 
describing the specific contributions of our study we present our samples and the methodological 
strategy for the empirical analysis. Sections 4 and 5 report our findings, and section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Background 
Previous research has demonstrated that the transition to adulthood since the late 1970s has 
become increasingly complicated (Aassve et al. 2002; Furstenberg 2010; Settersten, Furstenberg 
and Rumbaut 2006). Financial independence is a fundamental step to be considered an adult, 
associated with – but not identical to – full-time employment. As noted by Yelowitz (Yelowitz 
2005) in an article discussing the widely-held perception that the transition to adulthood has 
become longer, many young people (aged 19-28) in the US do not consider themselves 
“financially independent enough” to be an adult. The achievement of economic self-sufficiency, 
however, has been delayed together with the other events leading to adulthood, possibly due to 
reduced economic opportunities and to the stagnation of real wages for many groups of 
American workers during the 1970s and 1980s (Duncan, Boisjoly and Smeeding 1996; Katz and 
Autor 1999). Changes in the labor market over the past forty years, e.g. technological changes in 
the production process, spread of globalization, the decline of unionization, etc. made it more 
difficult for young adults to attain economic stability and self-sufficiency (Danziger and Ratner 
2010; Duncan, Boisjoly and Smeeding 1996).  
 There is, therefore, good reason to believe that it takes longer today to achieve a wage 
that permits economic autonomy and, in particular, enough to establish a separate household and 
support a family (Danziger and Rouse 2007; Smeeding and Phillips 2002). Earnings levels 
became uniformly lower over the 1970s and the 1980s, at least for male workers. Moreover, 
failure to obtain a college degree or dropping out of high school dramatically decreases the 
probability of earning a middle-class wage. For many less-educated individuals, unemployment 
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has become a substantial problem, with their unemployment rates significantly higher than those 
of more educated people. This is especially true for disadvantaged minorities. As with 
unemployment, wage levels have become more correlated with education level. Shifts in the 
labor market toward higher-skilled jobs have eroded wages for many with the least education, 
leading to growing income inequality. Within low-skilled jobs, mobility is also reduced, 
lowering the possibilities of advancement on the job. Further, jobs overall have also become less 
stable over time. This created greater uncertainties about young adults’ ability and willingness to 
take on adult responsibilities, and about their long-term socioeconomic characteristics (Duncan, 
Boisjoly and Smeeding 1996; Hill and Holzer 2006; Oppenheimer 1988). Even when social 
transfers are taken into account, a significant proportion of young people remain unable to 
support themselves, and much less a family, before their mid- to late twenties (Smeeding and 
Phillips 2002). 
 These outcomes may also contribute to delays in other markers of the transition to 
adulthood, such as completing education, establishing independent living arrangements, 
marrying and having children. Certainly, the employment and earning changes of the past four 
decades have affected the transition to adulthood in ways that vary sharply by gender and 
education. Education expansion has been more substantial among women, who started from a 
lower level and managed to catch up with men in getting college degrees and enrolling in 
graduate studies. The same is true for the labor force participation rate, given that its increase for 
females has been much more pronounced. If young males with a low level of education take 
longer now than they did in the mid-1970s to become self-sufficient and to earn enough to 
support a family by working steadily in a job with good wages and benefits, young women are 
more likely to attain self-sufficiency now than they were in the mid-1970s (Danziger and Ratner 
2010).  
 The changing economic situation of young men and women has potentially important 
implications for the second phase of adult transitions, union formation and parenthood. Career 
opportunities and earnings, in fact, affect decisions about marriage and parenthood differently by 
gender. Among men, steady employment and earnings are positively associated with marriage 
and childbearing (Becker 1981; Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001; Blossfeld et al. 2005; Gibson-Davis 
2009; Gibson-Davis, Edin and McLanahan 2005). For women, the picture is more complex. The 
new home economics (Becker 1965; Mincer 1962) hypothesis is that women’s economic 
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independence is the main reason behind delayed marriage and motherhood in industrialized 
countries. This independence effect is driven by better education and career opportunities, with 
consequent higher wages, which enable women to forgo marriage. Gains from marriage and role 
specialization within marriage dissipate with women’s growing investments in human capital 
and careers. The higher their level of education and the better their job opportunities, the more 
likely women are to postpone or even avoid marriage and motherhood. An alternative 
hypothesis, with different implications, is that women’s earnings contribute to a couple’s higher 
standard of living, which encourages marriage (income effect). Which scenario dominates is not 
clear yet and appears to be dependent on other factors such as local and country context, birth 
cohort, and educational attainment (Harknett and Kuperberg 2009; Sweeney 2002).  
 
 There are several reasons behind these changes in labor market outcomes and economic 
self-sufficiency among young adults. One important factor explaining the delay in the 
achievement of financial independence is the expansion of education that took place in the last 
40 years. Today it takes longer to build the human capital necessary to establish economic 
independence and as a consequence, a growing number of young adults may linger for a long 
time in a state of semi-autonomy. As a matter of fact, by spending more time in school they are 
delaying economic independence and temporarily giving up job earnings, but they are improving 
their capacity to earn good wages in the future (Bell et al. 2007).  
 Beginning in the 1970s – and until the late 1980s – the U.S. economy began to 
experience periods of great instability. Some date the end of rapid real earnings growth and the 
beginning of slower growth in 1973 after the oil embargo that resulted in a deep recession. At the 
same time there was an acceleration in the growth of earnings inequality, especially among men 
(Levy and Murnane 1992). For both men and women, increased inequality in earnings was 
driven by increased wage variation rather than increased variation in hours worked. The supply 
shifts alone, however, cannot explain the rapid changes in income inequality. Also the demand 
for skilled workers relative to unskilled ones played an important role. 
 During the 1970s the large baby boom cohort entered the labor market creating what has 
been called the Easterlin Effect. Easterlin’s argument theorizes cyclical changes in demographic 
and social behavior as the result of fluctuations in birth rates and cohort size during the post-
World War II period. Large cohort size reduces the economic opportunities of its members and 
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reduces income relative to smaller parental generations (Jeon and Shields 2005; Macunovich 
2011; Pampel and Peters 1995). “Low relative economic status in turn leads to lower fertility, 
higher rates of female labor force participation, later marriage, higher divorce and illegitimacy” 
(Pampel and Peters 1995). There are mixed findings related to Easterlin’s theory, some providing 
support (Jeon and Shields 2005; Macunovich 2011) and some others claiming that the change in 
relative cohort size was not predictive – or at least powerfully predictive – of changes in labor 
market outcomes and social behaviors (Pampel 1993). Even considering the Easterlin effect as 
true and effective, it can explain only in part the worsening of economic conditions of young 
adult that has been constant over time since the 1970s. The Easterlin effect should have resulted 
in cycles in economic opportunities and financial independence in the ensuing decades that have 
not been observed.  
 In sum, the structure of the U.S. labor market has changed substantially in the last four 
decades to face global competitive pressure, decline of unionization, and the raise of jobs 
demanding high human capital. During this period, a decline occurred in tenure and long-term 
employment relationships, with a subsequent increase in the proportion of workers with short-
term contracts. Despite the sustained growth in employment in the United States until the 
Recession of 2007-08, there is longstanding concern that the quality of the stock of well-paying 
jobs in the economy is deteriorating.  Stable jobs with high wages have been replaced by service 
sector jobs, that report high rates of turnovers, low wages and frequently by part-time 
employment. Employers need to rely more on temporary workers, on subcontractors, and on 
part-time workers, because they need more flexibility to face greater uncertainty regarding 
product demand (Farber 2007).  
 Along with these structural changes, youths’ expectations about what it takes to live 
independently have risen, along with the actual costs of living. The cost of housing, for example, 
rose in the last decades, especially from 2000 to 2005, before coming to a sudden halt in August 
2008 with the severe economic crisis. This process culminated and stopped with the economic 
crisis beginning in August 2008. Furthermore, expenditures on children in dual-parent 
households (middle income) increased on average by 20 percent from 1960 to 2008) (Lino and 
Carlson 2009). The main drivers of this growth can be found in housing costs, health care 
expenditures, childcare and education, transportation costs, and clothing. The higher costs of 
living and of raising a child contributed to growing attitudes that a full-time job was insufficient 
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to live independently and build a new, independent household. Yelowitz (Yelowitz 2007) tried to 
assess how changes in the cost of housing, transportation, and childcare affect living 
arrangement decisions, and he found that there is a significant effect of housing and 
transportation costs in the expected direction: the higher the costs, the lower the percentage of 
young adults living independently. In particular, the results show that rising real housing costs 
can explain 15% of the total change in independent house living arrangements in the U.S. 
between 1980 and 2000.  
 Some researchers, though not dismissing the structural roots associated with the 
extension of education and changes in the labor market for young adults, contend that the 
changes in the timing of adult transitions can be partially explained by a shift in cultural norms 
regarding home-leaving and family formation. In this paper we do not specifically consider the 
possible effect of normative and cultural changes, but we only take into account the growing 
interest in the role that families and parental socioeconomic status may play in shaping life 
course trajectories. The precise mechanisms by which family background and socioeconomic 
status affect the transition to adulthood and the ability to achieve economic self-sufficiency are 
largely unknown, but presumably include factors such as role modeling, labor market 
connections, neighborhood influences and parents’ ability to make monetary investments in their 
children. Moreover, the association between parents’ socioeconomic status and young adult 
outcomes may also reflect the intergenerational transmission of genetic traits such as intelligence 
or motivation (Guldi, Page and Stevens 2007).  
 
This paper examines three specific research questions related to the changing barriers to gaining 
financial independence: 
1: How has timing of the entry into the labor market and of the achievement of financial 
independence changed since 1970s? 
2: How do the trends differ between younger men and women? Has there been convergence 
between men and women in employment and financial indepence trajectories over time? 
3: How do the changes in the transition to adulthood over time differ by social class and family 
background? Is the role of parental socio-economic status changing over time? 
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3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
The NLSY are a series of nationally representative samples of young men and women, designed 
to gather information at multiple points in time on their labor market activities and other 
significant life events. In this study, we use the NLS Original Cohorts (NLS hereafter), and both 
the NLSY79 and NLSY97. The first one began in 1966 for men and 1968 for women, 
interviewing 5,225 young men and 5,159 young women who were age 14-24 (born between 
1941 and 1954). The NLSY79 began in 1979 with the survey of 12,686 young men and women 
who were age 14-22 (born between 1957 and 1964).  These individuals were interviewed 
annually through 1994 and are currently interviewed biennially. The NLSY97 consists of a 
nationally representative sample of approximately 9,000 youths who were age 12–16 in 
December 31, 1996 (born between 1980 and 1984). Round 1 of the survey took place in 1997 
and respondents are interviewed annually. All these surveys are implemented to document the 
transition from school to work and into adulthood.  
Substantial differences exist between the data sets, but they all collect essential 
demographic and socioeconomic information. Hence, we know respondents’ educational 
attainment, employment and earnings, partnership status, living arrangements, and some family 
background details, such as parents’ education level. Exploiting data included in these surveys, 
we compare individuals making the transition to adulthood in 1973, 1987, and in 2007, 
respectively. Following this strategy we obtain three samples with an almost identical age range 
(22–30 in the NLS and in the NLSY79, and 22–28 in NLSY97) but in three very different 
historical contexts. The NLS includes people born in the last years of World-War II and in the 
Post-war decade, so they can be considered baby boomers. This was a time of substantial 
economic growth and prosperity. The NLSY79 cohorts (late Baby Boom) were born in a period 
in which the U.S. economy was still growing and expanding. However, by the time they reached 
adolescence and earlier adulthood, many of the forces that contributed to the prolongation of 
adult transitions were underway. Nonetheless, labor market prospects were still relatively good at 
the end of the 1980s, after a severe recession earlier in the decade during which wage stagnation 
started and income inequality rose. The NLSY97 cohorts were raised in a period of varying 
prosperity and in an era when a two or four-year college education became increasingly essential 
to enter the middle class. 
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1973-Round of NLS, Round 9 of NLSY79, and Round 11 of NLSY97 (the focus of this 
study) include fewer individuals than their respective first rounds owing to attrition. Moreover, 
the NLSY79 contains a military sample (individuals born between 1957 and 1961 and serving in 
the military as of September 30, 1978) and a group of oversampled economically disadvantaged 
whites. We exclude both these groups to make the samples more comparable. After dropping 
these individuals (1,280 of the military sample and 1,643 economic disadvantaged whites) and 
those with missing information on essential variables, we are left with 6,888 individuals in the 
NLS (49.4 percent men and 50.6 percent women), 8,590 individuals in the NLSY79 (48.4 
percent men and 51.6 percent women) and 7,418 respondents in the NLSY97 sample (51.4 
percent men and 49.6 percent women).  
 
3.2 Methods 
In order to answer the first research question we start by describing the employment situation of 
the young adults in the three samples. Secure, full-time employment is defined, according to the 
conventional definition, as working more than 35 hours per week and more than 40 weeks per 
year. The structure and main characteristics of the samples are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
We next compute the percentage of young adults who are able to live independently and support 
themselves with their own earnings. To define the affordability of living independently, we use 
the poverty thresholds established by the U.S. Census Bureau2 and consider economic self-
sufficiency to include those who report an income that is greater than 200 percent of the poverty 
threshold.3 In addition, and still using Census Bureau poverty thresholds, we compute the 
                                                          
2 The Census Bureau updates poverty thresholds each year. Values of the poverty thresholds for the years 1960–
2008 for families of different sizes are available on the Census Bureau's website, and they differ by age 
(distinguishing between families with members under and over age 65). Thresholds are the same for all mainland 
states, regardless of regional differences in the cost of living, and are updated annually for price changes using 
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).    
3 All the analyses presented in Sections 4 and 5 have been repeated using two alternative definitions of economic 
self-sufficiency. We used the simple poverty line (and not two times the poverty line) as a threshold, and a within-
sample threshold, specified as the average income of respondents in 1973, 1987 and 2007, respectively. Results with 
alternative definitions of economic independence are similar to those presented here. 
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percentage of individuals who can support a family of three with their earnings (still considering 
as able to support a family those earning more than 200 percent of the poverty threshold for that 
family size). Poverty thresholds for years and family units considered in the analysis are reported 
in Table 2.4 All the analyses described above are produced separately for men and women in 
order to address the first part of the second research question, i.e. how the trends in the transition 
to economic self-sufficiency differ by gender. 
Table 2 
 
The concept of economic self-sufficiency can be defined in several ways, such as being able to 
live in a separate household, without any family members and without any financial support 
from the family of origin. It can also be defined as the ability to establish a partnership and have 
a child. In addition, the source of economic independence is also relevant. It can be earnings 
from work, welfare and social transfers in addition to wages, family income, or even loans. 
Young adults who decide to go to college or graduate studies after that will achieve financial 
self-sufficiency at an older age than those who do not go to college. However, investing in more 
education can pay off in the long run and can lead to a more secure job and a higher standard of 
living. Consequently it is unclear whether economic independence should be evaluated using 
current income, if any, or the discounted flow of future earnings. Moreover, the current amount 
of earnings together with expectations about career prospects can influence decisions about 
standard of living (e.g., affordability of a marriage or of childbearing). Individuals with low 
incomes in early adulthood may decide not to marry or have children. Others who have higher 
earnings, or who can expect a substantial wage growth, may feel more secure in deciding to 
                                                          
4 Our measure of financial self-sufficiency is only based on wages and self-employment income, and does not reflect 
family support, taxes, or welfare transfers. However, reforms to the cash assistance program in 1996 substantially 
altered access to cash assistance.  The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with a more flexible block grant, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), attached work mandates and time limits to receipt of welfare. It 
is impossible to accurately measure its impact with our data (and it is not feasible for the NLS), which can cause 
some bias in our estimates. However, we computed the total amount of welfare transfers received by respondents in 
NLSY79 and NLSY97 samples. Hence, we have information about AFDC or TANF, food stamps benefits, 
unemployment insurance, and Supplemental Security Income in 1986 and 2006. Exploiting this important 
information, we can add welfare transfers to wages and perform the same kind of analysis implemented using labor 
earnings. Results including welfare transfers are used as robustness checks, but the main trend and the differences 
between 1987 and 2007 do not differ substantially from the analyses without welfare transfers. 
 10 
having a greater number of children. In this case it is hard to classify individuals as economically 
independent and to establish which one of the two conditions implies greater economic self-
sufficiency.  
 Furthermore, the meaning of self-sufficiency may have changed from 1970s to 2007. 
Both expectations about what it takes to live independently and the actual costs of living have 
changed. The housing market conditions and child care services and costs have undergone 
considerable transformations, as has the welfare system. All these aspects contribute to shaping 
individuals’ attitudes and beliefs about their prospects and strategies to achieve economic 
independence.  Ideally, to answer our research questions, it would be necessary to define 
economic independence taking into account all the issues discussed above. Our measure should 
adapt to changes in the costs of living and also to people’s expectations. Likewise, it would be 
necessary to follow people over time in their transition to adulthood, to focus on life course 
trajectories and to investigate how investments in higher education may delay the achievement of 
economic independence but also improve the subsequent standard of living. However, the 
approach we take here is somewhat limited by the nature of the data. We use panel data in a 
cross-sectional way. We cannot exploit the longitudinal data to follow young adults over time, 
given that there are only two waves of NLSY97 after Round 11, the one investigated here. This 
also means that our measure of economic independence is built on current income, rather than a 
life course approach. However, by just using the NLSY79 and NLS, we would lose ability to 
compare the current situation with that in the 1980s and 1970s. Consequently, even though our 
approach is incomplete and partial, it will shed light on the evolution of young adults’ 
characteristics in the United States in the last 40 years and establish the basis for future research 
when new waves of NLSY97 will be released.    
 
Also, our examination takes account of the importance of social class variations over time by 
computing the proportion economically independent and/or able to support a family by parents’ 
education level. Parents’ education level5 is based on three different categories: we divided the 
distribution of parents’ education into terciles, in order to take into account the fact that 
education expanded over time – not only for respondents, but for parents as well. As a matter of 
                                                          
5 We used the highest level of education between that of the father and that of the mother. 
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fact, the threshold dividing the first and the second terciles is “10 years of education” in 1973, 
“11 years of education” in 1987, and “12 years of education” in 2007. Also the threshold 
dividing the second and the third terciles has changed over time, “12 years of education” in 1973 
and 1987, and “14 years of education” in 2007. 
  Finally, we implement an event history analysis – through some complementary logistic 
regression models with random effects for individuals (Lancaster 1979; Nickell 1979) – to 
explore the possibility of a convergence in life course trajectories among men and women, and to 
investigate the association between the parental social class and the timing of economic self-
sufficiency. We merge the three data sets and we include some socio-demographic variables, 
such as age (as a time-varying covariate) and race, and then we start including other explanatory 
variables step by step in order to answer our research questions. First we include time dummies 
to see how the timing of economic independence differs across cohorts, and a gender dummy to 
detect the distance between men and women. Secondly, we include some interaction terms 
between the gender dummy and the time dummies to test the hypothesis that there is some 
convergence over time in the life course trajectories of males and females. Third, we incorporate 
the covariates referring to family background – parents’ educational attainment and whether the 
respondent was living with both biological parents at age 14 – to shed light on the environment 
in which the respondent grew up, which may influence the transition to economic independence. 
Many studies show the effects of parental education, occupation, number of siblings, family 
income, and other characteristics of family background on the timing of school completion, labor 
force entry, marriage, and parenthood, and on their sequencing (Duncan, Featherman and 
Duncan 1972; Hogan and Astone 1986; Marini 1978; Marini 1984). Relatively disadvantaged 
family circumstances or relatively low levels of resources have been linked to early exit from 
school, early marriage and parenthood. Having relatively less educated parents, growing up in a 
household with neither natural parent or with a stepparent, and having more siblings are 
associated with lower per capita income, which can deter marriage. The impact of family 
background on the timing of home-leaving is less clear cut. Last but not least, we do interact 
parental education level with time dummies and also with gender to investigate whether and how 
the role of family social class has changed in the last four decades, and if it has a different role 
for men and women. 
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 The results do not establish causal relationships or uncover exact determinants of 
economic independence, but the findings can still shed important light on young adults’ 
conditions in the United States.  
 
4. Trends in financial independence over time 
The first step is to compare the three groups of young adults on employment status and economic 
independence. The mean age of working full-time is 25.6 in 1973, 25.9 in 1987 and 25 in 2007 
(with a standard deviation of 2.5 in 1973, 2.2 in 1987 and 1.4 in 2007, and median age equal to 
25 in 1973, 26 in 1987, and 25 in 2007).6  
Except for the NLS, all NLSY data sets over-sample Hispanics and blacks. Therefore, if the data 
are not adjusted, the greater number of black and Hispanic respondents would skew population 
averages toward black and Hispanic averages. For this reason, we adjusted the data using 
population weights when computing the proportion of those who are employed “full-time” and 
economically self-sufficient. 
 Figure 1 reports results for men and women relative to the trends in employment status 
and economic independence, over time and by age. As expected, the percentage of men working 
full-time increases with age for all the three groups. However, the percentage of males who have 
a full-time job is highest in 1973, decreases in 1987, and it is lowest in 2007. Moreover the 
differences sharpen with age, except for ages 25 and 26, for which we observe very similar 
percentages in 1973 and 1987. If in 1973, by age 29-30 almost 90% of males in the sample are 
employed full-time, this proportion drops to 79% in 1987, and to 65% in 2007. This is a very 
clear signal of the worsening in the situation of young males in the U.S. over time. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Our measure of income sufficiency shows a similar pattern.  In this case, however, the 
difference is apparent even at very young ages and does not decrease with age. Interestingly, in 
all years – 1973, 1987 and 2007 – the percentage of individuals able to live independently or 
afford to support a family is lower or at most equal than the percentage working full-time. This 
                                                          
6 Note that the age range is wider in 1973 and 1987 (22-30) than in 2007 (22-28). 
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suggests that even with a relatively stable job, some young men are unable to earn enough to 
start their independent households. The distance between these two figures (percentage working 
full-time and percentage economically self-sufficient) is greatest for NLSY97 respondents. 
Hence financial independence is lowest in 2007, and this is certainly true at individual level. It is 
worth mentioning that this might not be the case at household level, given that men in the later 
cohorts who are in a partnership have combined incomes with working women, or women are 
completely supporting their spouses. The last graph in Figure 1 referred to young men shows the 
proportion of respondents able to support a family of 3 people with their earnings. We observe 
exactly the same pattern as for economic independence, possibly with even larger differences in 
the three groups.  
 In contrast to deteriorating economic circumstances over time for men, women’s 
economic position does not erode (bottom part of Figure 1). Nor do we observe the same strong 
gradient by age in the percentage of women working full-time. An increase with age is still 
evident for women in 1987 and in 2007, although in the older age groups percentages are very 
similar, suggesting that there may be an upper limit for the share working full-time 
(approximately 50-55 percent). Interestingly, if percentages working full-time are very similar in 
1987 and 2007, they are much lower in 1973. This shows the considerable increase in 
educational attainment and, certainly, in female labor force participation rates. It can also depend 
on a rise in the labor force participation of women with children or on the decline in fertility, or 
both.  
As for economic independence, however, when we look at 1987 and 2007 the results do 
not show significant differences with respect to men, except for the fact that distance between the 
two samples decreases with age. The proportion of women who report to be financially 
independent in 1973 lies in between that for the other two data sets until age 24. From age 25 it 
is even lower than in 2007, showing once again the improvements of women in the labor market. 
The pictures describe the progress of women in the 1970s, until the late 1980s, but then show an 
adjustment that bring them closer to the trend we observed for men. The share of economically 
independent women is clearly much lower than for men, ranging between 33 percent and 50 
percent in 1987, and between 18 percent and 39 percent in 2007. The shares do, however, 
increase with age and are higher in 1987 than in 2007 at all ages. 
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 There is a good possibility that education plays a role postponing full-time work. The 
level of education increased over time, and both men and women in 2007 were enrolled in school 
longer than their counterparts 20 or 40 years earlier. Being a full-time student normally prevents 
one from being a full-time worker and from being able to earn enough to be independent. On the 
other hand, being more educated increases the likelihood of finding a secure job and earning a 
good wage. We replicated the analyses shown in Figure 1 while excluding those who were still 
in school in all samples to ensure that the different proportions of students did not bias the 
results. Results from these analyses do not differ from those shown above. 
 The next step is to look at how the proportion of young men and women who achieved 
financial independence differs by level of parents’ education. Results are reported in Figure 27. 
Among men we observe an increase with age in the proportion of those self-sufficient, and a 
monotonic decrease over time periods. Moreover, there is a gradient by education level: the 
higher the parents’ education level, the less evident is the postponement in achieving economic 
independence. The distance between the the 1st, 2nd and 3rd terciles would have been much more 
pronounced if we were looking at respondent’s education attainment (Figure 2.A in the 
Appendix). However, we can still observe an increase from the 1st to the 2nd tercile. Surprisingly 
there is not such a big difference between the 2nd and the 3rd terciles, as we expected to find a 
higher proportion of men who achieved financial independence among those with parents in the 
third tercile and it is not the case. One explanation can be that in the past the real difference was 
between those with no education or just with primary education and those who attended high 
school. An high school diploma most likely was enough for parents of respondents interviewed 
in 1973 and in 1987 to find a good job, earn good wages and so to assure their children a 
favorable family background and environment where to grow up. If this is true in the past, not 
necessarily it is accurate to describe the picture in 2007. However, the threshold between the 1st 
and the 2nd terciles in 2007 is “12 years of education”, meaning that the difference between the 
1st and the 2nd terciles is between those with college educated parents and those with parents who 
did not attend college.  
Figure 2 
                                                          
7 We also reproduce the analyses using the number of years from the end of education instead of age. This gives 
information about the time young adult could spend in the labor market to build up enough income to become 
economic self-sufficient. Results do not show significant differences (See Appendix). 
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 In this Figure we also show the graphs related to the ability of supporting a family of 
three persons with wages. The proportion among men is clearly lower, for all periods and for all 
age groups. Again the percentages increase with age and decrease over time. In this case the 
distance between the different terciles is more visible, and the gradient of the delay decreases 
when parents’ education increases. 
 If we look at the two corresponding graphs for women the picture is much more blurred. 
The proportion of women who achieved economic self-sufficiency increased by age only in 
2007, independently on parents’ level of education, and in 1987 for women whose parents are in 
the 3rd tercile of the distribution. Possibly, these graphs show how women are becoming more 
similar over time in terms of employment and financial independence. On the other hand, if 
among men we observed a decrease over time in the proportion economically self-sufficient, 
among women there is an increase from 1973 to 1987, and then just a small decrease in 2007. 
Moreover, we notice an improvement by parents’ level of education, especially from the 1st to 
the 2nd tercile. The increase by parents’ education is slightly less marked in 2007, meaning that 
probably trends in female labor force participation are becoming less dependent on family 
background and parents’ education. Finally, investigating the ability of women to support a 
family, we find a striking low proportion that is able to do that among those whose parents are in 
the 1st tercile of the distribution. In addition, the upward trend in the ability to support a family 
by parents’ education is more evident than that for financial independence itself. 
The Figures presented above showed clear signals of delay and postponement in the achievement 
of economic self-sufficiency, even with different degrees of intensity and strength. Delay is more 
pronounced among men, and it is greater among those whose parents are low educated. 
Generally speaking, however, if the downward trend is so widespread and apparent, it is 
extremely important to investigate more deeply the mechanisms behind it. This can be helpful to 
reduce the postponement by proposing labor market strategies that support young adults to 
become self-sufficient at an earlier stage.  We return to this question in the conclusion of the 
paper.  
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5. Convergence between genders and the role of parental social class in the timing of 
economic self-sufficiency? 
As described in section 3.2, we implement an event history analysis – through some 
complementary logistic regression models – in order to understand which factors are associated 
with the timing of economic independence (our response variable takes the value of 1 if the 
respondent is able to support him- or herself, and 0 otherwise). To do that we use our data 
longitudinally, and build the event history for economic independence to study when respondents 
became self-sufficient for the first time. Some of them have never achieved independence, and 
are therefore censored. We describe the results only in qualitative terms, reporting the results of 
the regression analysis in the appendix (see Table 1A). 
 As expected age and race are important predictors of self-sufficiency. As a matter of fact 
being older increases the “risk” of achieving self-sufficiency, while this risk is lower for “non-
white” respondents. The analyses confirm what we reported in Figure 1, and so that the 
probability of achieving financial independence is significantly lower for women, and it is also 
lower in 2007 and 1987 than in 1973 showing the delay of this event over time. But what we are 
interested in is the possibility of a convergence over time in men and women life course 
trajectories, and the results reveal that the difference in the timing of economic independence 
across gender is becoming smaller over time. This is probably due to a strong delay among men 
and some progress among women, who increase their participation in the labor force. 
When we look at the role of family background we find that having parents with high education 
slightly increases the probability of achieving independence. This means that growing up in an 
“advantaged” family may have some beneficial effects in terms of economic independence 
during the transition to adulthood. However the positive role of parents’ socio-economic status 
seems to change over time, being strong and evident in 1987 but not in 1973 and in 2007. Also, 
the association between parental socioeconomic status and the “risk” of becoming self-sufficient 
is different between men and women. The beneficial effect that we may observe is stronger for 
women, suggesting that being from an advantaged family makes it easier to achieve economic 
independence for a woman than for a man – who is probably better off in terms of employment 
and earnings independently on the conditions of the family of origin.  
  A potential limitation should be noted. We do not have information on other key 
explanatory variables that could potentially shed light on why it is so difficult to achieve 
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economic independence and why it became more difficult in the last four decades (e.g., family 
income, if respondents own the house they live in, etc.).  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
The transition to adulthood has changed considerably between the 1970s and late 2000s in the 
United States. It is much more difficult for young adults to achieve economic independence in 
2007 than it was 35 years before. A sizable difference exists between 1973, 1987 and 2007 in the 
percentages of young people able to live independently or to support a family of three people 
with their own earnings. The picture is to some extent different for men and women. Among 
young men, the differences grow with age, suggesting that postponement of economic 
independence is considerable and that over a six-year time span we do not observe any catch up. 
Among women, we observe an increase over time in the proportion working full-time, due 
mainly to a substantial expansion of education and an increase in the female labor force 
participation. Nonetheless there are signs of convergence over time in the situation of men and 
women concerning the achievement of economic self-sufficiency.  
While the postponement of economic independence over the past four decades is clear, 
the potential implications of the delay for family formation have not been examined directly in 
this paper. Men’s lower proportion working full-time and their later economic self-sufficiency 
may have a “negative” impact on the timing of marriage (or cohabitation) and parenthood, 
transferring the delay also on these events (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001; Blossfeld et al. 2005; 
Gibson-Davis 2009).  The positive results obtained by women do not necessarily counterbalance 
the effects of men’s delay of economic self-sufficiency in family formation (Harknett and 
Kuperberg 2009; Sweeney 2002). As a matter of fact, an increase in the proportion of women 
working full-time and able to support themselves may not translate into incentives for marriage 
and motherhood – as it might happen for men. It certainly depends on which one between the 
independence and the income effect prevails, not to mention the role of institutions and welfare 
state. 
 Education surely plays an important role in achieving economic independence, and the 
higher the educational attainment, the less likely it is that an individual will live in poverty. 
Staying in school for a longer time, however, is one possible reason for the delayed entry into the 
labor force. Hence, if education plays a role because it expanded and more people spend more 
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years in school starting later the transition to adulthood, then it is easier to recuperate for those 
with a college degree.  
 In the second part of the analysis we have also investigated the role of family 
background, how it influences the transition to economic independence, how its role has changed 
over time, and its different impact on men and women. We argue that it is essential to take 
socioeconomic background into account when trying to interpret the delay in the achievement of 
financial independence, on top of possible structural changes and possible normative shifts. We 
found that it has a positive, even if rather small, association with the probability of becoming 
self-sufficient, and that this association is stronger in 1987 than in 1973 or 2007, and it is 
stronger among women than among men. 
 
 The debate about which one between structural changes in the U.S. economy and labor 
market, and normative shifts concerning youth’s attitudes is still open, and it should be an 
important topic for future research. In all likelihood these forces are both in place and shape 
young adults’ lives and choices. Their expectations, of course, are not completely independent of 
the awareness of tougher labor market conditions. At the same time, it is possible that many 
couples retain preferences in the ideal situation for earlier family formation if economic 
conditions permitted. However, the early patterns of family formation characteristic of the post-
war period were probably not sustainable in an era of a slower growing economic and an 
increasing demand for higher skills in the labor market. So we suspect that norms have changed, 
but we also consider it likely that the normative change reflects the new realities facing young 
adults from the conditions that their parents experienced in the 1980s and their grandparents in 
the 1960s.  
One of the advances of many developed societies is that they developed mechanisms that allow 
young adults to do "other things" rather than starting work or a family relatively early. Education 
is clearly one example of this, which is in part financed by transfers (private and government), 
loans, and high returns to education. One possible question is whether the young adults who are 
in higher education today would rather be on a career track as their parents were in their early to 
mid-20s. In this perspective, the delay could be seen as a response to the opportunities offered to 
them. To better understand what is happening, future works should look directly at people’s 
attitudes towards employment and what it takes to be self-sufficient, and also should investigate 
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the effect of policies aimed at changing the structure of the labor market. Also we need to focus 
our attention on the possible implications of the delay for the formation of the family, and on 
how changes in the timing of the first steps in the transition to adulthood may affect timing of 
other events – i.e. forming a co-residential union and having a child – later in life.  But that is the 
topic of a future paper.     
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. NLS (1973), NLSY79 (1987) and NLSY97 (2007) Sample Characteristics  
    1973   1987   2007 
Mean Age  25.4  25.7  24.9 
% Female  50.6%  51.6%  49.6% 
% Enrolled in school  10.8%  8.5%  15.5% 
% in a union  69.5%  50.0%  42.5% 
% Married  62.7%  42.3%  23.6% 
% Cohabiting  n/a  7.7%  18.9% 
% with at least 1 child  56.3%  41.7%  34.1% 
% living with parents  21.6%  24.4%  28.1% 
% working "full-time"   51.7%   54.7%   51.8% 
Unemployment rate*  5.6**  7.0**  4.6** 
Labor Force Participation Rate*  60.4**  65.2**  66.2** 
       
N   6888   8590   7418 
*Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics      
 **NB: we use information concerning the year preceding the survey 
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Table 2. Poverty Thresholds. Source: US Census Bureau 
 
  1972 1986 2006 
1-person family unit (members age < 65) $ 2,168 $ 5701 $ 10,488 
3-persons family unit (members age < 65) $ 3,339 $ 8,820 $ 16,227 
NB: we use poverty thresholds of the year preceding the survey, because earnings are 
referred to that year 
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 Figure 1. Share of Men and Women in 1973, 1987 and 2007 Who Were Working Full-Time and Who Had Attained Economic Independence 
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Figure 2.  Share of Men and Women in 1973, 1987 and 2007 Who Had Attained Economic Independence, by age and parents’ education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1.A Share of Men and Women in 1973, 1987 and 2007 Who Had Attained Economic Independence, by years from the end of education 
and parents’ education 
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Figure 2.A Share of Men and Women in 1973, 1987 and 2007 Who Had Attained Economic 
Independence, by age and level of education 
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Table 1A8. 
 
Complementary Logistic Regression, Y = 1 if able to support themselves with earnings, 0 otherwise. 
Number of observations: 22,896. 1973: N = 6,888. 1987: N = 8,590. 2007: N = 7,418 
Odds ratios (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 1.359*** 1.359*** 1.373*** 1.374*** 1.374*** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Race: non-white 0.633*** 0.634*** 0.686*** 0.694*** 0.691*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] 
Female 0.376*** 0.166*** 0.190*** 0.188*** 0.147*** 
 [0.008] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] 
t: 1987 0.559*** 0.359*** 0.380*** 0.286*** 0.291*** 
 [0.015] [0.013] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] 
t: 2007 0.972 0.515*** 0.537*** 0.503*** 0.529*** 
 [0.026] [0.018] [0.022] [0.029] [0.031] 
1987*Female  2.619*** 2.264*** 2.291*** 2.235*** 
  [0.138] [0.132] [0.133] [0.130] 
2007*Female  4.005*** 3.467*** 3.492*** 3.201*** 
  [0.214] [0.204] [0.205] [0.190] 
Live with parents when 14   1.135*** 1.121*** 1.122*** 
   [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
Father Education ≥ 12 yrs   1.049 0.915 0.829** 
   [0.027] [0.049] [0.047] 
Mother Education ≥ 12 yrs   1.178*** 1.041 0.928 
   [0.032] [0.056] [0.053] 
1987*Father Education ≥ 12 yrs    1.269*** 1.259*** 
    [0.086] [0.085] 
1987*Mother Education ≥ 12 yrs    1.328*** 1.317*** 
    [0.090] [0.089] 
2007*Father Education ≥ 12 yrs    1.13 1.12 
    [0.076] [0.075] 
2007*Mother Education ≥ 12 yrs    1.03 1.019 
    [0.071] [0.070] 
Female*Father Education     1.259*** 
     [0.064] 
Female*Mother Education     1.302*** 
     [0.069] 
Standard errors in brackets. P-values: p ≤ 0.10:*, p ≤ 0.05:**, p ≤ 0.01:***  
 
                                                          
8 As for the analyses presented in Figure 1, we replicated the analyses in Table 3 excluding respondents who are still in 
education, not to produce biased results due to the expansion of education over time. Results do not show significant changes. 
We do not show the results of the models concerning the ability to support a family, given the similarity with those in Table 1A. 
However, they are available upon request. 
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